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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. [redacted] 25X1

CD NO.

COUNTRY Germany (Russian Zone)

DATE DISTR. 12 May 1952

SUBJECT Number of Railroad Cars Loaded for the Russians in the DDR

NO. OF PAGES 2

25X1

PLACE ACQUIRED [redacted]

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF INFO.

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. 25X1X

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

[redacted]

1. [redacted] 25X1 the following numbers of freight cars were loaded during the period from 1 through 7 March 1952:

Railroad District	Date in March						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Berlin	163	61	172	267	169	153	253
Greifswald	11	5	43	62	16	85	2
Schwerin	-	8	12	11	13	31	1
Cottbus	1	14	7	5	-	1	7
Magdeburg	15	-	73	66	16	245	152
Halle	97	87	54	255	33	110	47
Dresden	164	122	29	55	111	125	94
Erfurt	140	26	46	93	11	72	21 *

Locomotives required for these shipments had to be made available by the regional railroad headquarters, which constituted a heavy strain on German railroad operations.

25X1 2. [redacted] calculated the daily average of freight cars loaded for the Soviet Army between 1 and 9 March 1952 as follows:

Railroad District	Daily Average of Cars Loaded
Berlin	185
Greifswald	42
Schwerin	9
Cottbus	11
Magdeburg	116
Halle	101
Erfurt	66
Dresden	98 **

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3. The Magdeburg regional railroad headquarters was experiencing great difficulties in handling scheduled rail traffic. These difficulties were caused by the necessity of running a large number of special trains, allegedly troop trains, for the Soviets. *

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* [redacted] Comment. As compared with the last reported status of 21 February, the number of railroad cars that had to be made available for the Soviets increased considerably in connection with the present training program of the Soviet occupation forces.

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** [redacted] Comment. This average exceeds by about 60 cars, the corresponding figures listed in paragraph 1 of the present report. Increased loading performances on 7 and 8 March may have contributed to this result.

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